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ON THE ACQUISITION 
OF FIRST SYMBOL SYSTEMS 
HOWARD GARDNER 
I am able to enter into other systems of 
expression, at first by grasping them as variants of my 
own, and then by letting myself be inhabited by them 
until my own language becomes a variant of them. 
-Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
The Problem: Required to master an unfamiliar ritual, code, 
game, domain, or field of knowledge, the normal adult may 
invoke powerful aids. At his disposal are a number of symbol 
systems acquired earlier in life, including those of natural 
language, pictorial representation, and mathematics. These 
symbol systems may be drawn upon freely as the adult seeks 
to translate the foreign material into terms more accessible to 
him, or, alternatively, to adapt or impose an already-
mastered language upon the less-well-known terrain. Even 
when such translation is of dubious accuracy, the adult is 
driven to search for links between symbols already known 
and a domain in need of conquest. 
I focus here on the problem confronted by the individual 
who is seeking to master a symbol system, but who lacks an 
already-mastered symbol system upon which he may draw. 
Such acquisitions are crucial for human beings, whose daily 
life is permeated, indeed dominated, by every manner of 
symbol: words, pictures, numbers, works of art, maps, 
diagrams, models, special codes of assorted design. There has 
been among scholars increasing interest in the steps by which 
the young organism masters the dominant symbol system in 
our culture, that of natural language. And yet, the underlying 
question of what skills, capacities, strategies, and other 
equipment must be presupposed for a first symbol system to 
be mastered, has received little discussion in the psycholog-
ical or philosophical literature. 
The issue posed here has sometimes been side-stepped. It 
may be held, on the one hand, that symbolization is an 
inevitable human characteristic, like eating or walking, and 
should be taken for granted; it may be argued that 
symbolization is just an elaborated form of contact or 
communication, not differentiable from the signaling com-
mon throughout the animal kingdom, and, as such, unworthy 
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of isolation for special study; or it may be conceded that 
symbol use is an important human capacity, but inasmuch as 
it is fundamentally akin to other psychological systems, its 
study should be collapsed with the investigation of more 
general principles of learning. 
Without restating the case for symbolization, which has 
been exhaustively set out elsewhere {Langer 1962), let me 
simply respond to these objections. Perhaps some symbolic 
capacity is indeed available to infrahuman organisms; in all 
likelihood the processing of symbols shares features with 
oth~r cognitive activity. Even so, however, the relative 
prominence of symbolic activity is so much greater among 
humans than among other organisms that a qualitative 
difference in importance seems indicated {see Ploog and 
Melnechuk 1971 ). Moreover, whatever parallels symboliza-
tion shares with other mental functions does not dim the fact 
that a number of characteristics of symbols and symbol 
systems do differentiate them from, say, highly mastered 
motor skills or enduring traits of personality {see Bruner, 
Olver, and Greenfield 1966). Finally, and of greatest impor-
tance, it is simply not the case that all organisms routinely 
acquire symbolic capacities. Much evidence indicates that 
certain symbol systems, say visual language, mathematics, or 
music, pose considerable difficulties for otherwise normal 
individuals {see Cruickshank and Hallahan 1975); and even 
after an individual acquires working familiarity with such 
symbols, the degree of effort entailed in their use, and the 
extent to which the individual feels comfortable with them is 
likely to differ enormously across symbol systems. 
This last point motivates much of the present treatment. 
In the past few years, investigators have become increasingly 
aware of the great variety of symbol systems which figure 
prominently in human activity; the disparate media and 
sensory systems which facilitate comprehension and con-
struction of the world; and, in particular, the reliance of 
central artistic and scientific functions upon communally-
shared systems of symbols {see Goodman 1968). And yet, 
astonishingly little is known about the way in which these 
various systems are acquired; the kinds of differences 
obtaining among individuals in the course of acquisition; the 
degree of translatability among these systems; the means 
available to the individual for parrying various symbolic 
difficulties. Accordingly, I seek here to fix more precisely the 
nature of this set of issues and to provide some initial 
empirical suggestions about the acquisition of first systems of 
symbols. Clearly, any discussion of such vexing questions will 
be tentative and preliminary, the data still sparse and 
disputable. Nonetheless, given growing interest in these 
questions, initiation of a scholarly debate seems desirable. 
How, then, to approach this topic? There is, first of all, a 
small body of relevant literature. Various conceptual con-
siderations should also be brought to bear. But two groups of 
subjects promise to provide especially powerful insights: 
young children, who have not yet gained proficiency in any 
symbol system of their culture; and brain-injured patients 
who, in seeming defiance of their prior symbolic com-
petence, have been left in a position where they, too, must 
construct new symbol systems more or less "from scratch." 
Insights into the processes of acquisition of new symbol 
systems appear likely to come from these two subject 
populations. 
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PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 
Before considering the data furnished by these two 
groups, three brief discussions seem indicated: (1) statement 
of the point of view adhered to, and the terminology 
adopted in the following discussion; (2) citation of selected 
earlier stances on the question under consideration; and (3) a 
listing of critical issues to which our own research has been 
directed. Following these preliminaries, we will then review 
the findings obtained with children and with brain-damaged 
patients; indicate the parallels and divergences in first symbol 
use among the two populations; and revert, in closing, to the 
principal issues of the paper. 
Point of View and Terminology: 
Symbols are to be considered as those elements which 
refer to, represent, or denote in some fashion other objects, 
elements, concepts, or, in certain instances, the denoting 
element itself. When these elements are organized into some 
pattern or system wherein the elements occupy a definable 
and functional relationship to one another, one may speak of 
a symbol system. The referential aspect of symbol use will be 
considered its semantic portion; the formal relations obtain-
ing among the symbols within a system will be considered 
the syntax of that system. 
Though (within human society) symbolization occurs 
almost invariably for communicative purposes, a useful 
distinction can nonetheless be drawn between communica-
tion and symbolization. Communication will consist in the 
transmission of information from one organism to another, 
where at least one of the organisms has the intention to 
convey or infer meanings: if the infant cries and the mother 
responds by feeding, or if the mother and child eye one 
another playfully, information may be said to have been 
intentionally conveyed, and communication will have oc-
curred. Yet, because no independent element represents, by 
convention, another element, there has on this definition 
been no symbolization. 
Whether symbolization can occur without communication 
proves a more delicate matter. My inclination is to consider 
as communicative only such symbolization as involves two 
organisms intent on transmitting information, and who are 
mutually engaged in such an endeavor. On this definition, I 
would exclude transmission of information within mech-
anical systems, as well as the activities of the solipsistic 
individual who plays with a symbol system for his own 
edification alone. However, I recognize the validity of a 
position which would regard any symbolic message as 
potential communication. 
The distinction between symbolization and communica-
tion serves two purposes. It allows us to differentiate the 
activities of the communicating infant from that of the 
symbol-using toddler; and the activities of the brain-damaged 
patient who cannot utilize mediated forms of communica-
tion from the acts of the patient who can. Moreover, the 
distinction proves relevant to a symbolic area on which we 
will focus here, that of the arts. An individual may devise a 
symbolic art object which fails to communicate what was 
intended, or perhaps even fails to communicate anything at 
all. By the same token, the distinction points up the 
difference between the child who fails to use a symbol 
system appropriately, but who nonetheless communicates 
some information; and the child whose intended communica-
tion is embodied in symbolic garb. 
I do not argue that symbols constitute a simple and 
readily defined group, nor that non-symbol use can be 
handily differentiated from symbol use. If it has confirmed 
nothing else, our own work documents the complexity of 
both these issues. It was an understandable, but potentially 
misleading, practice of many early semioticians to I ump 
together all manner of symbols. However, as Nelson Good-
man (1968) has clearly demonstrated, symbol systems differ 
from one another in the extent to which · they resemble a 
digital or language-like system- as opposed to an analog or 
picture-like system. Other distinctions also need making: 
some symbols, like those which figure in music, emphasize a 
syntactic element; some, as in painting, highlight semantic 
properties; others, like the literary arts, feature syntactic and 
semantic properties with allied prominence. Viewed along 
other lines, symbol systems can be usefully differentiated on 
the extent to which they draw upon the body itself (e.g., 
mime, dance, finger paintings), as opposed to "foreign" 
elements (sculpture, easel painting, instrumental music). 
Even as the variety of symbol systems is manifest, the 
levels of symbol use are multiple. No pursuit is more 
thankless than the quest for a certain moment -in time, a 
certain point in complexity, which bifurcates the world, one 
side cast as symbolic, the other forever barred from the 
promised semiotic land. Far more fruitful is a search for 
levels of symbolization. One may, for instance, posit the 
following symbolic understandings which come in turn to 
characterize the young child: (1) a single element can stand 
for some other element; (2) a set of elements can stand for a 
situation or a composed scene; (3) the same idea or principle 
can be expressed symbolically in a number of ways; (4) there 
are symbol systems, which one can use deliberately for 
certain ends, and which one may alter or create anew. Such 
levels of understanding emerge at distinct points in the I ife of 
the individual and should not be carelessly collapsed into a 
single skill called "symbolic competence." 
Tensions Within the Literature on Symbolization 
Among the rather circumscribed circle of philosophers, 
psychologists, anthropologists, and educators who have 
pondered such questions, certain bones of contention have 
periodically surfaced. Semioticians can be divided, roughly 
speaking, into those who focus on the individual symbol 
user, and those who focus on the cultural context within 
which symbol use unfolds; those who focus on microgenesis 
(the stages which un,fold over a brief compass of time) and 
those who examine macrogenesis (the evolution of symbolic 
understanding over the course of years or even centuries); 
those who investigate the formal characteristics of symbol 
systems and those who ponder the biological prerequisites or 
underpinnings of symbolic activity; those who see symbolism 
as an inevitable emergence, and possibly even an innate 
human characteristic, as contrasted with those who adopt a 
more empirical and tentative stance vis-a-vis the emergence of 
symbolic behavior; those who regard the emergence of 
symbolic activity as a qualitative leap in individual and 
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cultural evolution, as compared with those who view 
semiotic skill as a more natural, gradual, and quantitative 
transition in the development of organisms. 
The contrasting sets of views sketched here are rarely held 
any longer in extreme form, though their echoes still 
redound prominently in contemporary writing. While not 
attempting to mediate directly among the various emphases, 
we will retain them as background for our own discussion: 
and perhaps some new clues about where the balance among 
them should be struck will emerge from our studies of 
symbolization. 
FOCAL ISSUES 
While the contrasts just described lurk in the wings of any 
semiotic study, our research has been directly designed to 
confront a number of questions concerning initial symbol 
use. Here these questions will be briefly stated; following a 
review of the available evidence, some tentative resolutions 
will be offered. 
(A) The Question of Simultaneity 
Given that all symbol systems cannot justifiably be 
lumped into one semiotic mound, the question still remains: 
Does symbolization tend to emerge at approximately the 
same time in a variety of media or symbol systems; or is the 
particular medium of such importance that level of symbol-
ization with one medium in no way predicts one's accom-
plishment with other symbol systems? Evidence of an 
emergence at a given moment of sophistication across several 
symbol systems would confirm the initial hypothesis; 
evidence of a staggered or irregular emergence would favor 
the second. 
(B) Order of Emergence 
Assuming that all symbol systems do not emerge at the 
same time, and with the same degree of sophistication, the 
question arises as to the specific differences in emergences 
and the factors underlying them. Mastery of A might always 
precede B, and B always C; in such a case, one would want to 
know the reasons for this fixed order. However, it might well 
be that some individuals commenced with one symbol 
system, others with different symbol systems; and, along 
these lines, that mastery of one symbol system was more 
advanced in one individual while sophistication with a second 
was prepotent in his peer. Again, interest would ultimately 
center on the causes of this more flexible picture. 
(C) Universality of Stages 
Any individual, confronted with a new symbol system, 
might be expected to pass through the same stages en route 
to mastery. However, some established facts, such as greater 
difficulty in adulthood of learning a new language, suggest 
that the individual's stage of life, his accumulated experience 
at the time of learning, and the condition of his nervous 
system, may well govern the particular contours of his 
symbol use. Whether all individuals master a new symbol 
system by passing through the same stages in the same order 
remains to be determined. 
(D) Individual Differences and Individual Creativity 
Were the experiences undergone by all individuals with all 
symbol systems identical, were all symbolic products simply 
replicas of one another, the nature of symbolic processes 
would assume no greater psychological importance than the 
processes of digestion or breathing. Yet striking differences 
are patent among individuals in their symbolic skills and 
preferences; moreover, certain gifted individuals have the 
ability to create moving new symbolic products. Just how 
originality and individuality emerge out of the uniformity of 
e'arly symbol use still remains an enigma. 
(E) Methodological Issues 
· Questions of method loom large in any study of symbol-
ization. Particularly pressing are the issues of how to 
determine whether a given behavior is mere imitation, or a 
"genuine" symbolic act; and whether someone understands a 
symbolic communication or is merely behaving "as if" he 
comprehends. These questions gain acuteness when inter-
rogation is precluded as a means of ascertaining the degree of 
mastery of a symbol system. 
Here we touch on the grounds ably surveyed by Roger 
Brown (1973) in his consideration of the pigeon ping-pong 
game. May one attribute to the pigeon knowledge of the 
game of ping-pong if he hits the ball properly across the net, 
or must he exhibit some understanding of the scoring system 
and the purpose of the game; moreover, how does one 
determine whether the pigeon has such an understanding 
unless he tells you that he does? By the same token, if one 
has exposed an aphasic patient to a new symbol system, and 
he now "plays his role" appropriately, can one verify that 
genuine communication rather than habitual execution of 
certain actions has taken place? While methodological in 
nature, these questions invade the essence of the processes 
we are attempting to elucidate. 
(F) Factors Contributing to Symbolic Mastery 
That a number of factors (e.g., motor facility, motivation, 
ability to adopt the perspective of another) all enter into 
mature symbol use hardly requires argument. Yet a full 
understanding of symbolic processes can come about only 
when the precise contribution of these various factors can be 
fixed with relation to specific aspects of symbolization, to 
particular kinds of symbol systems, and to specific aspects of 
communication. A tall order, but no less necessary in need of 
filling on that account. 
These, then, constitute the general point of view adopted 
here, the backgro~..;nd issues lurking in the semiotic literature, 
and the particular issues to which our own research has been 
directed. By now, the reader's desire for data will under-
standably be flamed; and so with some relief we can turn to 
our first group of subjects. 
SYMBOL USE IN CHILDREN: THE FIRST STAGES 
Within a few years, the young child evolves from 
communication which is entirely unmediated by symbols to 
communication which utilizes a variety of symbol systems. 
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He becomes able, over the same period, to appreciate the 
meanings of these symbols as they are employed by others. 
Among the systems commonly mastered are natural language 
and story telling, two-dimensional depiction {as in pen 
drawing), three-dimensional depiction {as in clay sculpture), 
and symbolic play {as with hobby horses or puppets). 
Using two separate populations, we have been charting the 
unfolding of these symbolic capacities. We have observed one 
dozen subjects, ranging in age from three to five on a 
cross-sectional basis, and we are currently working with a 
larger and older population of 45 five- to eight-years-olds. 
Each subject has been required to perform four different 
tasks, employing each of four separate media. One task being 
probed across media is "spontaneous" creation: the child is 
asked to tell a story, make a drawing, sculpt what he wishes 
out of clay, or enact a "scene" with two blocks which can 
"stand for" characters. A second task involves completi~n: 
the subject is provided with the beginning of a story, 
drawing, etc., and then asked to devise an appropriate 
ending. A third task features assembling: the subject is 
furnished with a large number of elements which could 
potentially be arranged into a symbolic product- lines of a 
story, parts of a drawing, pieces of clay, segments of an 
action sequence. The final task, again probed with all four 
symbolic media, involves copying: the child is exposed to a 
finished product {story, drawing, etc.) and asked to duplicate 
it as best he can. Findings obtained from youngsters aged 
three to eight are providing detailed inventory of the range of 
symbolic products which can be elicited, under various 
circumstances, from normal children. 
Competent participation in these tasks is not possible 
until subjects have achieved considerable symbolic mastery. 
Insight concerning the very first stages of symbol use requires 
a much younger group. Moreover, if the texture of develop-
mental process is to be conveyed, it is advisable to follow the 
same subjects over a period of time. We have, accordingly, 
undertaken a longitudinal study in which we are following 
five first-born middle-class infants from the first year of life 
for at least the following two years. 
These studies are still continuing and earliest findings have 
been reported elsewhere {see Gardner, Wolf, and Smith 1975; 
Wolf and Gardner 1976). Let us therefore focus on the 
implications of the evidence as it pertains to the principal 
theoretical issues outlined above. 
{A) The Question of Simultaneity 
Our cross-sectional study provides unequivocal evidence 
that symbolic development is of separate pieces. The same 
individual stands at different levels of sophistication, depend-
ing upon the symbol system being sampled. Many children 
can tell complex stories before they can represent the 
simplest human figure in drawing or clay; the opposite 
profiles of skills characterizes certain other youngsters. 
This said, we should add that each level of symbol use 
seems to entail certain prerequisites; once these prerequisites 
have been fulfilled, symbolic growth proceeds apace across a 
variety of media. For instance, the pivotal appreciation that 
one element can systematically stand for some object or 
referent seems to depend upon emergence of at least two 
prior capacities: (1) ability of child and caretaker to 
communicate in a reciprocal manner with one another; {2) 
appreciation that objects exist in time and space even when 
out of sight-the well-known object concept described by 
Jean Piaget {1954). Symbolic use awaits these milestones: 
once achieved, the child's level of symbol use is likely to 
advance across different symbol systems. 
By the same token, subsequent levels of symbol use may 
also await certain milestones. For instance, there seems to 
come a time, often around the age of three, at which the 
child first appreciates that a set of symbols can relate to one 
another in a manner analogous to a set of objects in the real 
world. A correlative realization, at a still later time in 
childhood, signals that a particular symbol can be looked at 
in a variety of ways; one may attend to its surface 
characteristics and its non-literal meanings as well as to its 
referential properties {see Silverman, Winner, and Gardner 
1976). Again, once achieved, this realization may yield rich 
dividends across a variety of symbolic media, as when the 
child comes to comprehend the concepts of style or 
metaphor in a number of art forms. 
{B) Order of Emergence 
A fixed order of emergence among the various symbol 
systems seems unlikely, and the achievement of mastery of 
individual symbol systems most certainly differs widely 
across children, as suggested in Figures 1 and 2a,b. We find 
some youngsters to be inveterate verbalizers: their use of 
language is extremely advanced; and they tend to respond 
verbally at every opportunity, even when only a non-
linguistic response is appropriate. Others among their peers 
are wedded with equal strength to visual-pictorial and 
spatial-gestural means of expression; such visualizers or 
non-verbalizers explore with enthusiasm the visual and design 
features of a medium, resist formulation in language, 
experiment continually with visually-regulated schemes. Not 
surprisingly, relative to linguistic accomplishment this latter 
group is much more advanced in its two- and three-
dimensional visual depiction. 
Whether, despite these obvious differences in skill and 
"richness" of symbol use, a regular order of emergence may 
obtain among symbol systems remains an open question. Our 
general impression is that the child advances first with those 
symbol systems which highlight motor patterns such as 
symbolic play, and whose early stages incorporate normal 
bodily actions -{such as waving one's arms back and forth in 
the case of drawing). In general, progress in use of a symbol 
system occurs rapidly, especially in the case of language. Yet, 
certain symbol systems, for example those used in music, 
seem to differ dramatically across youngsters in both the 
time of their original emergence and the rate at which they 
unfold. We feel, overall, that the order of emergence across 
symbol systems, while reflecting some regularity, has not 
been fixed by some inviolate rule. 
{C) Universality of Stages 
A converging body of clinical and experimental evidence 
challenges the assumption that a symbol system is always 
learned in the same way, irrespective of the age or prior 
experience, or cultural context of the subject. It may well be 
the case, on logical or psychological grounds, that certain 
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Figure -drawing by Max, age 3!6, a typical visualizer; 
the drawing is made in complete silence, except for a final 
comment, "Here, I'm done." 
steps in symbolic mastery must occur in a certain order. And 
yet, evidence on learning by older normal individuals and by 
brain-damaged adults suggests different approaches in learn-
ing a symbol system reflecting the individual's facility with 
diverse modes of cognition. As a consequence of these 
diverse approaches, the texture of mastery of a symbol 
system differs among such subjects. We find, for instance, 
that in learning new gestures, dance steps, or musical 
passages, adults often "lean upon" linguistic or other symbol 
systems which have already crystallized. Such encoding may 
shorten and sharpen the task; but if the coding should 
highlight irrelevant or incidental properties of the new 
system, while obscuring its more salient or defining 
characteristics, these bootstraps may ultimately strangle the 
learner. 
(D} Individual Differences and Creativity 
Our studies have documented the enormous individual 
differences among symbol users as young as two and three 
years of age. In addition to the intriguing dichotomy 
Figure 2 -drawings by Molly, 
age 3!6, a typical verbalizer; the 
first drawing elicits a comment 
on writing, while the second 
stimulates a dramatic recitation. 
between verbalizers and visualizers, other differentiae have 
emerged. Youngsters can be classified as relatively person-
centered or relatively object-centered; as adopting a planning 
or a playful approach to tasks; as advancing from one to 
another symbolic stage at a steady and regular rate or as 
progressing more quickly, more slowly, or at a more irregular 
pace. Some children tend to feature trademarks, fixed 
schemes, or themes in their works, while the work of others 
is relatively bereft of such characteristic features. There are, 
finally, "self-starters" who tend to commence symbolizing 
without prompting and are motivated to continue on thelr 
own. There are also subjects who, while pained when 
confronted by an unstructured task, may well succeed more 
efficiently and with greater success when asked to finish up 
or to copy another's product. We speculate that such 
"self-starters" have a greater potential to become practicing 
artists; their "completing" counterparts may be better suited 
for editorial, performing, critical, or audience-member roles. 
Examined separately, these dichotomies (and others like 
them} may appear interesting but not especially revealing. 
Combined, however, these resulting clusters yield new 
insights about the nature of individual accomplishment in the 
symbolic realm. No two individuals achieve identical scores 
on this raft of dimensions: and each score which departs 
from the mean contributes to a final product which may 
possess remarkable distinctiveness and value. 
In this summation of individualizing factors may lie a clue 
to the cognitive and affective components of symbolic 
activity. Nearly any work can be considered on a purely 
structural or formal level: the number of elements in the 
work; the extent and appropriateness of their organization; 
the manner in which they are mapped onto a field of 
reference. This approach taps what is often termed the 
cognitive level of the product, or the producer. Of equivalent 
import are the idiosyncratic features, the particular styliza-
tion and style of the work, the special emphases, details, and 
expressiveness, which command attention. These identifying 
marks stem less from any single dimension cited above than 
from a combination or interaction among them. Distinct or 
even unique symbolic creations may be viewed as the 
products of individuals, such individuals presenting profiles 
which differ on the dimensions listed above. Those works 
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which become especially treasured may be those which, 
however conceived, nonetheless can speak to individuals 
whose own profiles of psychological dimensions differ 
significantly. 
All this is somewhat apart from the question of intention-
al efforts to achieve originality or arrive at one's own style. 
At that stage of life where our attention is focused, 
differences emerge from the child's non-conscious use of the 
symbolic media. 
(E) Methodological Issues 
Examined in isolation, a legitimate symbolic product may 
not readily reveal its distinctiveness from blind imitation or 
from an unmediated communicative effort. However, by 
judicious use of contextual information and by clever use of 
experimental techniques, the analyst may achieve a reliable 
degree of confidence about the extent and level of symbolic 
achievement. 
Consider, for instance, a circle with two lines dangling 
underneath it, produced by a three-year-old subject. Should 
this be considered the depiction of a human being or simply 
1 geometric form with two straggling lines happening to fall 
underneath? On its own one might hesitate to consider this 
scribble as a symbolic representation. If, however, one -
encounters a variety of other drawings produced at the same 
time; one overhears the child's comments while making the 
drawing, or in response to questioning; or examines the order 
in which the parts were made and the degree of determina-
tion which characterizes the whole effort; or notes in the 
vicinity some forms to be traced-then a more judicious 
decision about the status of the product becomes possible. 
Experimental interventions can also provide helpful in-
formation. For instance, consider an assessment of the level 
of symbolic play. Should the child simply mime a model's 
behavior, conclusions about symbolic competence are risky. 
If, however, the child treats the model's behaviors as a point 
of departure for his or her own appropriate elaboration, then 
an inference of some symbolic sophistication can justifiably 
be drawn. Inclusion by the child of other individuals in the 
realm of the symbolic play, as well as involvement of objects 
which can potentially assume symbolic significance, may also 
testify to symbolic competence. 
Examination of a subject's strategies can provide a fresh 
perspective on assessing symbolic competence. Some subjects 
are especially likely to attain a higher level of symbolization 
at times when they return to familiar themes, or territories-
be these physical or psychological. Such "known locales" 
appear to stimulate a flight of inventiveness. Other subjects 
amplify their symbolic products by "verbal romancing"; this 
elaboration of a product through storytelling signals an 
incipient awareness that a product is not successfully 
communicating within its own symbolic language. 
Certain strategies or practices seem to be nigh unto 
universal among children: among these are the principles 
according to which early stories are constructed; the ways in 
which clay is initially molded; the "faces" of first drawings. 
When these emerge in their usual order, one may infer that 
symbolization is following its normal course. When, however, 
a product appears at a time, or in a context, where it is not 
ordinarily expected, this serves as a signal that a fresh form 
of symbolization (or perhaps a variety of non-symbolization} 
may have emerged. Our studies suggest that within each 
medium, a child typically passes through a number of stages. 
Originally, he simply manipulates the potentially symbolic 
material; next, he makes an organized but non-referential 
product of some sort; finally, he matches the symbolic 
product to elements, referents, or emotions in the world, 
thereby achieving genuine symbolization. 1 So long as this 
particular course is being followed, conclusions can be drawn 
with some confidence. If, however, a child who has not yet 
manipulated materials seems to be effecting a match to the 
world, the analyst is well advised to exercise caution before 
inferring symbolization. 
(F) Factors Yielding Symbolic Mastery 
The relation among the various factors which contribute 
to symbolization is extremely complex and until now only 
modest progress has been made in unravelling them. Our 
tentative conclusions will be best stated later on, in conjunc-
tion with findings about symbol use among the brain-injured. 
It does seem apposite to note, however, that some aspects of 
symbol use proceed with a speed, accuracy, and comprehen-
siveness, that is staggering to behold. After witnessing one 
child after another acquiring a series of grammatical 
morphemes in the same order, or passing through highly akin 
stages of musical or pictorial development, or exploring with 
great intensity and depth the realms of drawing or story-
telling, one may well conclude that the human brain is 
predisposed to proceed in this way; and that "language," 
"music," or "visual-picturing" devices may be "set" or 
"predisposed" to go off on their own, with but scant 
attention to various "real-world" factors. Perhaps various 
coding capacities possessed by the young child help him to 
impose structure and coherence upon his early symbol use, 
particularly its syntactic facets; perhaps, indeed, biological 
constraints render certain syntactic and semantic relations 
highly probable, others highly unlikely. 
SYMBOL USE IN BRAIN-DAMAGED PATIENTS 
There are many etiologies of brain damage, and many 
forms of injury even within the same disease process. As the 
brain is highly differentiated and patterns of injury are 
varied, efforts to generalize across brain damage and brain-
damaged patients should be regarded with suspicion. More-
over, each individual's developmental history is unique; and 
so the same objective brain damage may evoke varying results 
across patients. All the same, consistent and revealing 
regularities between types of brain damage and resulting 
behavioral sequelae have been verified in the century or so of 
neuropsychological research (see Gardner 1975}. 
In right-handed individuals, the use of language and 
language-like symbol systems is the particular province of the 
left hemisphere, whereas pictorial and visual-spatial forms of 
knowledge have a relative (though not an equally pro-
nounced} proclivity for the right hemisphere (again in 
right-handed persons}. This fact in itself undercuts the · 
assumption that all symbol use is of a piece in the 
brain-injured person, and, by extension in the normal person. 
yet surprisingly little has been established about the fate of 
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TABLE 1 
SPECIMEN MESSAGE TYPES IN VIC 
Message Types Occasion of Use 
Commands Issued by one communicator to another; directs the performance of a physical action (e.g., pick up an 
object) or a communicative action (e.g., to write a description of an action). 
Interrogatives 
A Used in conjunction with the specific "wh" interrogative particles. Elicits the patient's production of 
the correct answer regarding a temporally immediate event. 
B Used in conjunction with a simp.le declarative message for truth testing. A "yes" or "no" particle is the 
desired response. 
Simple Declaratives Used to express wishes such as "I want a cookie" or in response to a request for a description. 
Phatic or Emotional Utterances Used to comment upon one of the communicator's actions, to express a mood, or to greet another 
person. 
non-linguistic symbol systems in the brain-damaged in-
dividual. 
It is known that individuals can sustain a severe aphasia 
and still paint competently; that individuals with left-
hemisphere disease are able to "read" pictorial presentations; 
and that different facets of musical capacity are implicated 
by each hemisphere. For instance, perception of timbre and 
tone seems to be associated chiefly with the right 
hemisphere, sensitivity to rhythm is more prone to be 
lateralized to the left hemisphere. Individuals who become 
aphasic lose the ability to communicate with related lan-
guage-like systems, such as gesture, sign language, or morse 
code; and, given sizable brain damage in either hemisphere, 
the patient tends to become "concrete" in his behavior and 
understanding; grasp of abstract concepts proves difficult, 
independent of whether these seem to be mediated verbally. 
At the Aphasia Research Center at the Boston Veteran's 
Administration Hospital, we wondered whether individuals 
who were severely aphasic- such that they could neither 
understand nor produce comprehensible language-might 
nonetheless be able to acquire a language-! ike symbol system 
with which they could then communicate effectively. These 
were patients devoid of demonstrable symbolic capacity; 
ones who could communicate in only the most primitive 
ways- by screaming, pointing, or, perhaps, pulling. Con-
spicuously lacking were customary substitutes for language, 
such as the ability to visually depict a desired element, or to 
express meaning through gesture. By and large, these patients 
showed depressingly little inclination to communicate, al-
though, of course, one could never prove that they were 
devoid of all semiotic functions. 
As a way of confronting this question, we devised a new 
visual symbol system called VIC (for Visual Communica-
tion). In this "language," messages written on cards were laid 
down from left to right, each card standing for the equivalent 
of an English word, particle, concept, or sentence mode. 
Sample VIC symbols are depicted in Figure 3; specimen 
message types are cited in Table 1. As an introduction to 
VIC, patients observed accomplished VIC users employing 
this system; then the patients were gradually drawn into the 
VIC conversation. Our goal for the first phase of the project 
was to enable patients to master three basic aspects of 
communication: (1) carrying out commands issued to them 
(e.g., pick up the glass of water); (2) describing actions 
executed by another (John is shaking the fork); (3) answer-
ing questions (Who picked up the spoon?). Of the initial 
patients enrolled in this research-therapy program, several 
had to be dropped because they could not learn to associate 
a card to an object, and others had to be terminated because 
of medical complications. Of the remaining eight, all master-
ed some aspects of the language, five eventually passed 
through the "bare bones" described above, and two have 
achieved a somewhat greater command of VIC. The latter 
patients were able to express sample requests (I want a 
cookie), describe their feelings (I feel sad), and use the VIC 
cards spontaneously and productively. 
For all its imperfections, our method of exposing severely 
aphasic patients to VIC does provide an opportunity to study 
how an adult deprived of conventional symbol systems 
acquires a new one; to determine the degree to which he 
understands the nature of the system; and to contrast the 
behaviors and capacities of brain damaged adults with a 
group of normal, non-symbol using infants. We will now 
review the results of our project (cf. Baker et al. 1975; see 
also Gardner et al. 1976), drawing as well on other empirical 
studies, as they pertain to the principal issues raised above. 
(A) and (B) Simultaneity and Order of Emergence 
In the case of focal or limited lesions, symbolic capacities 
can break down in a variety of ways. It is worth noting, 
however, that in the wake of more generalized brain disease 
such as certain forms of dementia, a somewhat more regular 
order of breakdown may obtain among symbol systems. For 
instance, the ability to draw with some accuracy is relatively 
fragile, whereas ordinary language functions usually prove 
more robust. In a limited way, then, at least a modest 
regularity of breakdown among symbolic capacities may 
occur, one which may signal the relative complexities of 
these systems. However, contrary to the passionate claims of 
some, it is erroneous to speak of a general decline of 
symbolic c·apacity, at least in cases of focal brain damage. 
The ability to master VIC displayed by certain severely 
aphasic patients is in itself decisive confirmation of this fact. 
(C) Universality of Stages 
Our research, and other studies as well, suggest that the 
older an individual becomes, the more difficult for him to 
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Figure 3 -a selection of symbols used in VIC with their 
English translations: (a) proper noun, "Lynn" (; therapist's 
name); (b) common noun, "glass"; (c) verb, ''pick up"; (d) 
grammatical morphemes, "and," "in"; (e) punctuation, "?"; 
(f) interrogative particle, "who"; (g) metalinguistic marker, 
"describe" (or "write it"); (h) activity particle, "to go 
home." 
acquire a symbol system. An aphasic patient still in his 
twenties can expect to re-acquire natural language quite well 
and may with relative ease acquire a new symbol system: 
aphasics with comparable pathology at age 60 encounter far 
graver problems in recovery and in new learning. Whether 
differences in flexibility are qualitative or quantitative is 
difficult to determine; but, in my view, there may well be a 
qualitative shift occurring between the middle years of 
childhood (during which an individual can lose an entire 
hemisphere and yet master symbol systems) and middle 
adulthood (where even a limited amount of damage in the 
dominant hemisphere suffices to produce a permanent 
aphasia). These different recovery trends probably reflect 
basic reorganizations in the brain, ones correlated in some 
manner with the advent of adolescence; conceivably, how-
ever, the very mastery and consequent overlearning of a 
symbol system during early adulthood may complicate the 
learning of new symbol systems later on. Evidence bolstering 
this assumption comes from the tendency of older 
individuals to suffer relatively greater impairments following 
focal lesions and relatively milder impairments following 
"patchy" lesions; and also from the fact that certain varieties 
of aphasia, which feature fluent speech and an effortless 
parroting of over-learned phrases, are encountered only 
among post-puberty patients. 
One other factor is worth noting. Focal brain damage is 
most unlikely to impair the individual's ability to make his 
way about the world. Those individuals who learn VIC seem 
to be those able to draw on their experiences gained over a 
lifetime; those who have marked difficulties tend either to 
remain wholly. w~thin the system (learning a pointless game), 
or wholly w1thm the "world-space" (ignoring the new 
symbol system), without effecting the translation between 
the two. Whether or not they can utilize knowledge for 
sy~bolic purposes, both these groups differ from the young 
child. The latter subject has many fewer experiences on 
~hich to draw; and even these are less well-established and 
reliable. Moreover, the young child has but a simple model of 
communication on which to draw; the brain-injured patient 
has, in the past, been involved in a variety of communication 
systems which, even if remembered only partially, should 
nonetheless retain some salience. 
(D) Individual Differences and Creativity 
The distinctive life histories of each individual, coupled 
with the limitless variety of possible brain lesions, insure that 
the pattern of symbolic competences and deficiencies is 
never identical across patients. Contributing yet further to 
differences among patients are two factors bearing relatively 
less weight among children: ( 1) the attainment by some 
adults of certain specialized, highly developed skills, which 
may buttress the individual against certain forms of brain 
damage (for instance, an individual skilled in "speed" or 
"sight" reading is less likely to be impaired by aphasia than 
one who relied primarily on auditory input and oral rehearsal 
in decoding graphical materials); (2) strong personality or 
motivational factors. Given two patients of equivalent 
background and lesions, one a highly motivated person, the 
other relatively passive and unmotivated, the former is likely 
to fare better in rehabilitative efforts. These factors combine 
to insure a gallery of differences among the victims of brain 
disease. 
While differences among individuals are certainly pre-
served in brain damage, the possibility for creations of some 
distinctiveness and interest is definitely minimized. This 
situation suggests that differences in brain injury do not in 
themselves suffice to produce interesting differences in 
symbolic creation: such highly personal and significant 
products are far more likely to emerge when a healthy brain 
is working to its full capacity. The diseased brain has as its 
primary task coping with the daily presses of life; possibilities 
for involvement in symbolic inventiveness or novelty are 
greatly reduced. Indeed, a major problem in implementing 
VIC is the relatively reduced level of interest and motivation 
encountered among brain damaged patients. Success in VIC 
is most likely within that cadre of patients who remain 
"bright-eyed" (see Velletri-Giass, Gazzaniga, and Premack 
1973), and who engage in games, humorous exchanges, 
eye-to-eye contact, and other signs of a continuing com-
municative engagement- though not lingering symbolic com-
petence- with the events and persons of their environment. 
(E) Methodological Questions 
For the reasons already suggested, determining the extent 
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of the patient's symbolic and/or communicative involvement 
in VIC is a tortuous matter. With the young child, motivation 
and capacity to communicate seems relatively straight-
forward, but mastery of the symbol system is in dispute. For 
their part brain-damaged patients seem able to enter into the 
"rules" of the exchange with relatively little difficulty: in 
many situations they behave in ways highly appropriate to 
the situation. And yet, occasional complete lapses and total 
misunderstandings, coupled with a reluctance or refusal to 
employ the symbol system outside the usual training room, 
calls into fundamental question the extent to which this 
culturally-defined system is in fact functioning as a com-
munication mode. 
For experimenters, normal controls, and other 
"observers," VIC's potential functioning as a substitute 
communication system had been self-evident. And yet our 
research team was soon confronted with a conundrum: How 
do you convey to an individual that certain elements are 
designed as symbols in a communication system, if no 
alternative way remains of communicating anything to him? 
The difficulty of saying, in effect, "Look, here, VIC is a 
language," provides the best evidence that the brain-damaged 
patient resembles the asymbolic child. After all, the average 
adult could simply be told, in one or another way, that VIC 
is a visual communication system; the brain-damaged patient 
must learn this as part of a complete bootstrap operation. 
The strategies of the aphasic patients are revealing. They 
feature the partial, and often inappropriate importation to 
the VIC sessions of a raft of earlier schemes. At times VIC 
patients place cards in their mouths; put them on top of 
objects, whether or not the cards even match the objects; 
tend to manipulate objects idly when they have no grasp of 
the utterance; confuse the cards with the object; match the 
card in an utterance to a card in their response; erroneously 
assume that all utterances fall into a certain syntactic frame 
(Agent-Verb-Object); search for non-VIC cues to guide their 
symbol use; and so on. Revealingly, several patients have 
evinced a particular fascination with one of the VIC objects, 
an empty glass; in a manner reminiscent of the toddler's 
"fixed idea" or "familiar territory," these aphasics return 
almost involuntarily to the glass irrespective of its ap-
propriateness to the VIC scenario. They will confuse objects 
with glasses, stick objects into glasses, lift glasses along with 
each requested object, shift the glass from hand to hand, and 
so on. Whether reflecting a desire to "do something," or a 
primitive "modal" (Gardner 1973, Ch. 3) attraction to the 
tangible, inviting vessel-and-hole, this inappropriate persever-
ation signals that a patient has, at best, a very partial grasp of 
the rules of the symbol system. 
What evidence, then, can indicate that the communicative 
potential of VIC has been grasped? . Spontaneous yet ap-
propriate use of the symbol system is the most reliable 
indicator. And yet, just because spontaneous utterances can 
occur only in the absence of an experimental cue, these are 
unlikely to emerge. This result stands, of course, in striking 
contrast to that obtained with most children, for whom 
spontaneous use of the symbolic medium is an early and 
constant companion. In lieu of spontaneous use of VIC, less 
direct measures of competence are necessary. Relevant data 
can be gained by altering the customary form of an utterance 
(e.g., asking the patient to inject the pencil into the fork, 
rather than into the glass); removing a command or question 
so the subject cannot simply copy it; inverting the customary 
order of words in a question while still retaining the question 
mark; making a foolish error and evaluating the patient's 
reaction; introducing a new participant into the conversation 
and noting whether the patient can readily "converse with" 
and include in his descriptions this additional figure. To the 
extent that these "tests" are "passed" by the patient, 
incipient symbolic awareness may be assumed; to the extent 
that they engender difficulties, or evoke irrelevant responses, 
VICseems to be functioning as a ritual or game, rather than a 
viable communicational system. 
Some of the strategies used, errors made, and stages 
traversed, en route to VIC mastery, have been isolated. These 
trends supply additional evidence for evaluating the patient's 
mastery of the system. Should his behavior prove consistent 
with earlier patients, one can assume that he has attained the 
level of mastery of early VIC communicators. If, on the 
other hand, he violates the typical error, strategy, or stage 
patterns, one is put on notice that something irregular (or 
precocious) may be at work. As Figures 4 and 5 show, the 
errors made in the course of VIC reception and production 
are quite similar across patients, despite their sometimes 
dramatic differences in overall performance level, speed of 
progress, and nature of brain injury. At least among adult 
aphasics, the factors surrounding the mastery of a new 
symbol system seem to be operating in a similar manner. 
(F) Factors Yielding Symbolic Mastery 
The various factors affecting early symbol use in children 
are also manifest in brain-damaged patients, but the relative 
contributions of each may differ. For instance, while motor 
difficulties pose minimal obstacles to children, they present 
persistent difficulties for brain-damaged patients, most of 
whom are paralyzed. Surprisingly, however, the paralysis per 
se does not produce the difficulty; rather, the culprit is 
apraxia, (see Geschwind 1967), a difficulty in voluntary 
control of movements which leads to a performance other 
than that which the patient intends. Lamentably, these 
praxic difficulties are not readily corrected, and so the 
patient may find himself repeatedly intending to do (or say) 
something, while something quite apart results. The greatest 
tact and patience may be needed to overcome these praxic 
difficulties and to ascertain the actual level of the patient's 
sophistication. 
Motivation is another pivotal factor in symbolic mastery. 
In general, most normal youngsters are sufficiently 
motivated; however, brain-damaged patients, either because 
of age, personality change, or sheer effects of cortical injury, 
very often appear to lack the will or desire to enter into and 
master a new activity or system. Insufficient motivation, like 
apraxia, can of itself be so overwhelming that failure to 
symbolize results. Here, then, are areas where the child is 
better served than the brain-damaged patients. 
On the other hand, the brain-damaged patient also has 
some advantages. As indicated above, he has available and 
may draw upon a lifetime of experience. Principles, 
strategies, or clues learned during these years may put him in 
good stead as he tackles a new task. For instance, even if he 
can no longer symbolize, he knows, upon entering the room, 
that a task lies in front of him, that he is expected to behave 
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RECEPTION ERRORS 
10 
Figure 4 - pattern of errors in comprehending VIC mes-
sages committed by five patients who mastered the basic 
components of VIC: a "proper name" error involves a 
appropriate to VIC (e.g., touching, eating, fingering, cutting). 
Thus far, we have not been able to adapt our system so that 
it taps just those responses which the patient is likely to 
produce on his own. 
Perhaps the biggest difference between child and brain-
damaged patient is one both obvious and imponderable: 
p9ssession of a young and healthy brain (as opposed to an 
old diseased brain). No one yet knows exactly the properties 
and potentials of the young brain, nor even how to 
characterize them. But that the young brain - even in apes- is 
spectacularly equipped to master dizzying amounts of 
information about the physical, social, and symbolic world, 
is acknowledged by everyone. Moreover, the youthful brain 
has particular genius in acquiring syntactic regularities, 
coding patterns and features, across such diverse systems as 
pictorial representations, natural language, numerical lan-
guage, and music. Precocity in such areas as music, mathe-
matics, and chess found among children whose knowledge of 
the real world is yet meager seems compelling evidence that 
an abstractive capacity for picking out the formal properties 
of certain "language-like" systems is a potent feature of the 
young brain. And just here the brain-damaged patient is 
especially weak. Although patients with lesions confined to 
confusion among individuals present in the therapy setting; 10 0 
an "object" error involves a confusion among physical 
objects; a "verb" error involves the patient's performance of 90 
an action other than the one that has been signalled,· a 
PRODUCTION ERRORS 
"grammatical morpheme II error involves a confusion among 80 
prepositions or conjunctions (e.g., confusing "pencil in cup II 
with "pencil and cup"). 70 
in a socially appropriate matter, and that rewards (or 
non-rewards) signal his mastery of the task. Young children 
are ignorant of these factors and thus may fail altogether to 
enter into the experimental situation. Or, after entry, 
children are more likely to reject the whole situation 
altogether; brain-damaged patients, even if they themselves 
apparently have reservations, will keep these to themselves. 
Countering these trends is the fact that symbolic systems like 
VIC may seem inherently foolish to adults; they may 
therefore exhibit minimal motivation to master them, par-
ticularly if, as is often the case, the relevance to one's 
recovery is not clear. Children are less likely to develop 
reservations of this sort; assuming their mood is favorable, 
they will plunge with enthusiasm into most any new task. 
Along with his wealth of experience, the brain-damaged 
patient also retains an armamentarium of schemes and 
strategies which he may bring to bear on the new learning 
activity. Such habits and strategies are often firmly 
established, and as a consequence, much less readily changed 
than those encountered among young children. While this 
fact can cause great difficulty in teaching a new symbol 
system, it may at times be used to advantage: the new 
symbol system can be so arrayed that it draws on established 
schemes which are readily aroused in evocative situations. 
Unfortunately for our aims, however, the kinds of "card 
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Figure 5 -pattern of errors in producing VIC messages 
committed by five patients who mastered the basic com-
ponents of VIC: a "same category" error involves a con-
fusion among two items in the same syntactical category 
(e.g., confusing one object with another object); a "different 
category" error involves a confusion among items drawn 
from different syntactical categories (e.g., confusing a noun 
with a verb); a "grammatical morpheme" error involves a 
confusion among prepositions or conjunctions (e.g., con-
fusing "in" with "and"); a word order error involves a 
violation of the normal order among VIC elements (e.g., 
"john pencil shake" instead of "john shake pencil." 
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Figure 6 -drawings made by 
children at five stages in the 
development of representational 
skills: (a) scribble stage; (b) 
shape stage; (c) tadpole stage; 
(d) simple composition stage, (e) 
stylization stage. 
one site might, in theory, be able to master new symbol 
systems not dependent upon that area, in practice a selective 
sparing of symbolic fluency is exceedingly rare. Perhaps the 
injured brain must attend primarily to its (and the patient's) 
own well-being; there is a resultant turning-in toward more 
conservative functionings, a lessening of interest in the novel 
events of the external world. 
Assuming that the young child can enter at all into a 
symbol-learning system, he is likely to acquire the system 
more readily than the brain-damaged patient. The brain-
damaged patient stands out primarily in his potential for 
using general knowledge about the world and deploying 
certain well-established schemes. Only if the particular 
system in question is consonant with the adult's earlier 
schemes and strategies can this capacity be turned to 
advantage. 
It should be noted that studies thus far undertaken 
invo!ve only a limited amount of immersion by brain-
damaged patients in the symbol system. A total immersion 
over many months in the use and practice of the symbol 
system might yield more dramatic results. 
Parallels in Stages of Symbolization 
Over and above the differences detailed, suggestive 
regularities can be found in the particular stages through 
which children and brain-damaged persons pass. Indeed, one 
can discern some dozen steps shared by child and brain-
damaged symbol users. 
As an example, we will consider the phases through which 
the child and the adult brain-damaged patient pass as they 
encounter visual symbols. We have deliberately chosen tasks 
of some distinctiveness, so that emerging parallels may prove 
revealing rather than trivial. In the case of the child, we will 
focus on his progress as he learns pictorial representation (cf. 
Figures 6a-e); in the case of the aphasic patient, we consider 
a specimen sequence in the mastery of VIC. Some of the 
steps attained can be expected to occur with other popula-
tions and other symbol systems, but others are clearly 
restricted to the examples at hand. 
(1) Use of Primitive Bodily Schemes. In new symbol users, 
potential symbols are first mapped onto the area of greatest 
familiarity and knowledge. And in the case where there exists 
no extant symbol system, the mediator for new symbols 
becomes the body. The brain-damaged patient will place the 
card in his mouth or clutch it with his hand; the young child 
will take the marker and place it in its mouth, even as he may 
eat clay. 
(2) Use of Old, but more Neutral and Less Oral 
Schemes. The brain-damaged patient is likely to clutch the 
VIC cards, then move them back and forth on the table. The 
child will move a pencil back and forth in the air, or touch it 
alternatively on and off the paper. 
(3) Detection of Potentially Symbolic Elements. The VIC 
patient notes lines and ideographs on the cards and begins to 
realize that they bear significance in the use of VIC. The 
child commences attending to the strokes made by the 
marker, begins to make characteristic shapes, and becomes 
disturbed if the marks fail to appear when he wields the pen. 
(4) Referential Relations Appreciated: The Birth of Symbol-
ization. The VIC patient is able to match an ideographic 
representation with an object in the world (often this step is 
accomplished immediately, in which case earlier experience 
has short-circuited the first few stages). The child can now 
regularly produce certain forms, such as a circle or square; 
more crucially, he becomes able to relate these forms to 
objects in the world. Eventually, his own marks- such as the 
"tadpole" in Figure 6c- also come to stand for persons, 
animals, natural and man-made objects. 
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Naturally, these realizations represent crucial stages in the 
evolution of symbolization. Before, there was neither 
symbolic reference nor the possibility for symbolic com-
munication. Now, the whole world of reference becomes 
accessible to the symbol user. Yet at this point, in the 
absence of an ancillary symbol system, it is often difficult to 
assess whether the symbol user is conscious of the relations 
between symbol and signified, whether he appreciates the 
distance and distinction between them. A challenge for 
succeeding periods is the emergence of increasing distance of 
the vehicle or symbol from the element or object which it 
signifies. To the extent that the child or patient confuses the 
referent and its vehicle (patting the depicted cat; talking to a 
drawing), the relation of symbolization has not been fully . 
achieved. Yet, even advanced adults seem to maint(].in a 
lingering trace of the early link between symbol and 
object-and in the arts, this surviving primitive tinge may 
offer exciting allusive possibilities (see Gardner 1970). 
(5) More Elaborate Referential Relationships. Now an ar-
ray of symbols comes to stand for an array of objects in the 
world. The VIC patient can himself combine or can 
appreciate the concatenation of a series of nouns; the child 
can also handle references to more than one element. 
(6) Appreciation of Syntactic Relations. No longer restrict-
ed just to object names, the patient can appreciate utterances 
in which an actor acts out an action, or an object receives an 
action. He has proceeded from mere naming to the pro-
pounding of propositions. The young child can now map a 
series of objects arranged in a configuration onto some sort 
of visually depicted situation-the picture can "tell a story." 
(7) Incipient Sense of Composition. The brain-damaged 
patient has now attained familiarity with a set of sentence 
frames by which utterances can be constructed; that is, he 
possesses the mold for basic linguistic structures (e.g., 
actor-action-object) into which appropriate aliments can be 
supplied. The child no longer draws on elements in a 
haphazard fashion; rather, as can be seen in Figure 6d, he so 
arranges them that their relationship with one another 
becomes comprehensible to others. 
(8) Use of the Medium with Reference to the Other 
Individuals. Until referential aspects of the symbol system 
have been mastered, the symbol system is used by the 
individual in a relatively self-centered manner. Once some 
distance has been achieved, however, the individual increas-
ingly takes into account the state of knowledge of other 
individuals; he begins using the symbol system in such a way 
that their knowledge can be increased. Egocentrism declines; 
communicative use of the symbol system has been enhanced. 
(9) Generative Use of the Medium. A gradual explosion 
occurs in the number of elements and relations which can be 
encoded within the symbol system. No longer restricted to a 
few spare substantives and actions, the individual becomes 
able to express a whole variety of propositions. The VIC 
communicator assimilates new nouns, and begins to utilize 
those morphemes which modulate meaning. As is evident in 
Max's "busy" drawing (Figure 1), the drawing child now 
possesses "basic schemes" which can be combined to 
represent new elements and new relationships; both his 
drawings and his perception of displays may achieve an 
increasingly narrative tone. 
(1 0) Interest in the Properties of the Medium. With greater 
mastery comes increased understanding of and distance from 
the medium. Once it was used in a reactive and unconscious 
fashion; now the individual becomes aware of the elements-
what they can and cannot express-and assumes a more 
active role in experimenting with media possibilities. The 
VIC communicator tries to express new ideas and relations, 
including ones never before modeled in VIC. Experimenta-
tion occurs with word play, word mean·ing, word order. By 
the same token, the child begins to explore the design 
properties of the medium: what can and cannot be accom-
plished in drawing. He is no longer limited by the uses he has 
seen or by his knowledge of the world; the limitations of the 
medium itself constrain his performance. 
(11) Achieving Effects, Stylization. The individual now 
uses the symbol system in a way which reflects his own ideas, 
preferences, and feelings. Previously he tended to resemble 
other individuals; he was passing through a universal set of 
stages, a progression reflecting the demands of the medium, 
the physical limitations of his body, the cognitive predilec-
tions of his nervous system. Now he begins to place his own 
mark on the medium, not only in the subjects treated but 
also in the manner in which he treats them (cf. Figure 6e). 
He experiments with those effects which prove especially 
meaningful to him. The VIC patient too evolves his own 
method of aligning the cards and his own characteristic style 
of "speaking." 
(12) Use of a Medium to Express One's Feelings and Ideas to 
Others. While stylization may seem a self-centered activity, 
use of the medium to express to others one's favored ideas 
and feelings is a more public matter. These need to be 
conveyed in such a way that the distinctive elements, as well 
as the more common properties of the language, can be 
grasped by an audience. In the case of VIC the patient now 
achieves precision in the use of cards for communication of 
his own wants and feelings; in the case of the painting child, 
the capturing of emotions, feelings, and concepts now 
becomes possible in the language of pictorial depiction. Such 
effective communication of one's own thoughts can never be 
autistic of course; the communication must remain ever 
sensitive to the rules of the symbol system, the conventions 
of the culture, the context of the utterance, the knowledge 
possessed by the audience. Like the effective artist he must 
wed his personal vision to a publicity-interpretable symbolic 
vehicle. 
I must stress that the foregoing has been, in at least two 
ways, an idealized list. First and most important, only the 
opening stages, perhaps through the eighth, have proved 
accessible to the VIC communicators and drawing children in 
our studies. At most, slight glimmerings of the later stages 
can be discerned in the symbol use of the most precocious 
communicators. The list therefore includes what is likely to 
happen in future symbol use, in addition to what has already 
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been observed with our subjects. (And, given our small 
population, these speculations must rightly be viewed with 
suspicion; perhaps, for instance, the later stages of the series 
may prove impossible for most severely aphasic adults to 
achieve.) Second, to the extent that it possesses validity, the 
scheme of symbolization outlined pertains especially to two 
symbol systems in two populations that have rarely been 
contrasted: VIC with brain-damaged patients, drawing with 
normal children. In all probability, a different sequence 
would characterize other populations and alternative symbol 
systems. 
Nonetheless, the clear parallels found in the use of symbol 
systems among decidedly diverse populations are en-
couraging. Either in the nature of early symbolization, or in 
the nature of novice symbolizer, a certain logical progression 
obtains: from manipulating, to making, to matching, to 
medium sensitivity, and, ultimately, to mastery . Perhaps, 
with certain subjects or certain symbol systems, some of 
these stages can be eliminated or collapsed; however, it seems 
unlikely that the overall order would be fundamentally 
different. And if mastery of any new material were regarded 
as, in a certain sense, a task in constructing a new symbol 
system, this check list might suggest the optimal (or 
necessary) course through which any learner must pass. 
Depending on the task administered, different aspects of 
this progression, and distinctive profiles of achievement, will 
be attained. For example, the patient's competence and 
apparent symbolic mastery of VIC will appear greater if he is 
simply executing a command than if he has to describe an 
action or answer a question. By the same token , the varying 
tasks and media used in our developmental studies also 
highlight different capacities. ((Spontaneous" tasks, for 
instance, induce anxiety in some subjects but superior 
performances among ((self-starters." Copying and assembling 
tasks elicit a relatively higher level of symbolic mastery. 
Certain media also tend to evoke a characteristic symbolic 
performance. A child working with clay is likely from the 
start to produce little ((balls" and ((snakes"; the toddler at 
the easel is likely to persist longer in ((pure marking" or 
((pure makings," before moving on to depictions of the 
world. 
Different tasks also can highlight the extent to which a 
particular subject favors one over another symbolic medium. 
In tasks of symbolic play, those children with a verbalizing 
disposition are likely to accentuate the ((story" part of the 
drama; those with a visualizing flair are correspondingly 
likely to enact gestures with the figures, while restricting 
their verbal output. In one sense, these considerations only 
underline the obvious lesson that the analyst's assessment of 
symbolic competence is a function of the kind of tasks 
imposed on the subject. However, the deeper point is that 
one's assessment of symbolization is likely to attain accuracy 
only to the extent that diverse tasks are sampled under 
disparate contexts. 
OUR ISSUES REVISITED 
We have searched for insights about symbolic competence 
by focusing on the asymbolic individual bent upon mastering 
a symbol system. We have designated two populations which 
lend themselves to study; we have discerned instructive 
parallels and differences among them. 
We also sought evidence which might modulate among 
various tensions in the literature on symbolization. And we 
have confirmed the important role played by cultural setting 
in symbolic mastery, while indicating as well the effect of age 
of the individual and the condition of his brain. We have 
encountered parallels in macrogenetic processes, such as 
those governing the stages of a child's drawing, and micro-
genetic processes, such as those involved in acquiring a new 
symbol system over a few weeks in adulthood. We have 
witnessed a logic in the unfolding of symbol systems, while 
considering as well the influence of biological factors. 
And while confirming the human proclivity to engage in 
symbolic activity, we have challenged the notion that any 
normal human can master any symbol system with equal ease 
or proficiency, let alone that individual beset by brain 
disease. Finally, we have discerned both the continuities in 
acquisition of symbolization, as the individual passes gradual-
ly through a dozen stages of mastery, as well as the leap-like 
steps entailed in the first referential use of the symbol, the 
awareness that the symbol system has communicative as well 
as game-like properties, and the ultimate ability to attain 
distance from a symbolic medium and to deploy it as a 
means of expressing one's most treasured feelings and 
thoughts. 
What, then, of the principal issues toward which our 
discussion has been directed? Let us, one by one, revisit each. 
(A) The Question of Simultaneity 
There seems to be scant justification for the assumption 
of a single symbolic capacity which, having emerged, extends 
equally and readily to all manner of symbol systems. Some 
individuals will acquire one symbol system with great ease, 
while experiencing extraordinary difficulties with a second; 
precisely the opposite picture obtains with other persons. 
The most that can be said is that certain cognitive pre-
requisites underlie any kind of symbol use; only in this sense 
is talk of a central symbolic capacity justified. The literature 
on brain damage supports this finding, for a substantial 
percentage of brain-damaged patients have one symbolic 
system vitiated while others remain substantially intact 
(Gardner, Howard, and Perkins 1974). 
(B) Order of Emergence 
On the question of whether symbol systems are mastered 
in a fixed order, the evidence remains less conclusive. Still, it 
is our impression that there exists, at best, only a rough 
metric; those symbol systems which require little ((real-
world" knowledge and rely heavily upon bodily schemes, 
emerge relatively early; those which rely upon considerable 
knowledge and high-level cognitive operations, and which 
require the use of tools and mediating objects removed from 
the individual are somewhat more tardy. The strong dif-
ferences between left- and right-hemisphere patients, and 
between child verbalizers and visualizers, suggest that dif-
ferential neural organization may account for possible 
differences in the order in which symbol systems emerge, and 
the richness with which each is realized within a given 
individual, 
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(C) Universality of Stages 
There may be certain steps through which everyone 
utilizing a symbol system must pass. However, it makes a 
critical difference whether a symbolizer, or an individual 
devoid of symbolic experience, is learning the symbol 
system. One's previous history in the world, the schemes at 
one's disposal, the strategies employed also are relevant. 
Finally, the age of the individual and the health of his brain 
affect the manner in which and the ultimate extent to which 
symbolic mastery is attained. 
(D) Individual Differences and Creativity 
Creations of great individuality and power are more likely 
among children than among brain-damaged adults. In ad-
dition to the factors already cited, this difference in 
creativity seems to reflect levels of motivation and the extent 
to which old habits are firmly entrenched. In order to 
achieve individuality, one must ~ave some mastery of a 
symbol system but also some new meanings to express. The 
freshness with which one conceives the world is a critical 
factor here; however, in the last analysis, sensitivity to the 
conventions of the culture is an equally important ingredient 
in effective symbolization. 
A personal style seemingly results less from a single factor, 
such as tempo or cognitive skill, than from the combined 
effect of the individual's specific location on a score of 
measures: verbalizing versus visualizing, self-starting versus 
completion, object-centered versus person-centered, planner 
versus player, and so on. Differences among persons 
guarantee some individuality in all products, but the ultimate 
quality and interest of individual products probably reflects 
the uniqueness of an individual's position, the variety of 
messages eligible for communication, the overall level of 
motivation, and the amount of energy which can be 
mobilized for expressive purposes. The brain-damaged 
individual is particularly deficient in these latter respects. 
(E) Methodological Issues 
In the absence of the subjects' own testimony, no 
fool proof method exists for determining the extent to which 
symbolization has been mastered, or the degree to which the 
communicative and symbolic aspects of a medium are 
appreciated by its users. And in the absence of an alternative 
symbol system for communication, the only possibilities for 
inference open to the scientific observer are incisive observa-
tion and imaginative devising of tasks. A judicious combina-
tion of these methods should factor out those persons 
sensitive to the symbolic power of the system from those 
who are using it largely in an imitative, ritualistic, or 
game-like manner. However, attaining distance from one's 
symbolic activity is a gradual and lengthy process, and so it is 
unlikely that a specific point in time can be isolated at which 
"symbolic understanding" first occurs. 
(F) Factors Yielding Symbolic Mastery 
We have suggested throughout that symbolization requires 
a raft of factors, which in various ways interact with one 
another. We are not yet prepared to issue a formula for this 
mastery, although Table 2 indicates our preliminary guesses 
as to the relative importance across specimen symbol systems 
of such factors as motor mastery, syntactic understanding, 
semantic understanding, meaningfulness of single elements, 
extensive "real world" experience, specific brain regions. 
This list represents a kind of initial assessment of the 
respective challenges which assorted symbol systems might 
pose for various populations. And, in addition to the factors 
cited in the table, there is a further trade-off in our particular 
populations between rich experience in the world, and 
well-established habits, on the one hand, as against potential 
for discerning syntactic patterns, high personal motivation, 
and freshness of outlook on the other. 
In pondering the differences between the normal child 
TABLE 2 
FACTORS INFLUENCING THE MASTERY OF SYMBOL SYSTEMS 
Symbol System 
2-Dimensional Depiction 3-Dimensional Depiction Gestural and Bodily 
Factors Music Language/ Literature (e.g., drawing) (e.g., clay) Representation 
Motor mastery, limb control ++ + ++ 
Syntactic factors (organiza-
tion of units over time) + + + 
Semantic factors (representa-
tion of specific objects, events) ++ + + + 
Meaning inhering in single 
elements ++ + 
Extensive "real world" 
experience ++ + + + 
Highly specified brain regions +(?} ++ 
-(?} 
Potential role in communicating 
meanings ++ + + ++ 
Key: -- not important + = important ++=very important 
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and the brain-damaged adult, one encounters clues regarding 
the optimal mastery by the individual of any new area of 
knowledge, whether or not such knowledge is purely 
symbolic in nature. While both experience and freshness, 
motivation and knowledge are to be desired, what is clearly 
optimal is a workable ratio between the two. Without 
experience, freshness is likely to lead to vapidity or incom-
prehensibility; without freshness, experience is likely to lead 
to repetition, stereotypes, and rutted behavior. It is not 
enough to know how to use a symbol system; one must 
want to be able to communicate with it and one must have 
something worth communicating. Finally, one needs the 
capacity to look critically at the created product and 
determine whether, indeed, its intent has been effectively 
framed within symbolic conventions so that the other 
individual can attain it. If one could wed the freshness, 
computational power, and the desire for rich exploration of 
the child, with the strategies and experience of the older 
person, and if these could be housed inside the skin of a 
motivated individual with ideas to express, and with a 
healthy brain in which to express them, one would construct 
the ideal communicator, be he or she an artist, scientist, 
politician, or saint. Perhaps by "framing" this individual on 
either side, the child and the aphasic patient make their 
special contributions to the elucidation of communicative 
efforts of all varieties. 
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1 Musical symbols, which are apparently non-referential, appear to 
pose problems for this formulation. If, however, music is considered 
in its broader symbolic aspects, the general point of view is supported. 
For music is as capable of expressing meanings (e.g., the aspects of the 
world captured in program music, or the expression of emotional 
forms), and of referring to aspects of itself, as other, more obviously 
representational systems {cf. Howard 1973a, 1973b ). 
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